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ABSTRACT
Objective Raising the price of tobacco products is
considered one of the most effective ways to reduce
tobacco use. In addition to excise taxes, governments
are exploring other policies to raise tobacco prices and
minimise price dispersion, both within and across price
tiers. We conducted a systematic review to determine
how these policies are described, recommended and
evaluated in the literature.
Data sources We systematically searched six databases
and the California Tobacco Control library for English
language studies or reports, indexed on or before 18
December 2013, that included a tobacco keyword (eg,
cigarette), policy keyword (eg, legislation) and a price
keyword (eg, promotion). We identified 3067 abstracts.
Study selection Two coders independently reviewed
all abstracts and identified 56 studies or reports that
explicitly described a public policy likely to impact the
retail price of tobacco products through non-tax means.
Data extraction Two coders independently identified
tobacco products targeted by policies described,
recommendations for implementing policies and
empirical assessments of policy impacts.
Data synthesis The most prevalent non-tax price
policies were price promotion restrictions and minimum
price laws. Few studies measured the impact of non-tax
policies on average prices, price dispersion or disparities
in tobacco consumption, but the literature includes
suggestions for crafting policies and preparing for legal
challenges or tobacco industry opposition.
Conclusions Price-focused evaluations of well-
implemented non-tax price policies are needed to
determine whether they can deliver on their promise to
raise prices, reduce price dispersion and serve as an
important complement to excise taxes.
INTRODUCTION
Raising the price of tobacco products is considered
one of the most effective ways to reduce consump-
tion1–3 and is a highly recommended tobacco
control strategy worldwide.1 4 5 Although excise
taxes have effectively raised average product prices
in many jurisdictions, additional policies that rely
on mechanisms other than taxation may be needed
to maintain higher prices and prevent price dis-
crimination resulting in lower prices for price-
sensitive smokers.6–8
Countries all over the world have used tobacco
taxes to increase prices and reduce consumption,9
but not all tax initiatives are equally successful. The
tobacco industry works to defeat or limit proposed
increases through lobbying and other tactics,10 and
in many places other political barriers exist, result-
ing in tax and price geographic variation.11 12 In
the USA in 2014, average prices for a pack of cigar-
ettes ranged from US$5.06 in Missouri, where the
lowest excise tax is levied, to $10.56 in New York,
home of the highest.13 The structure of a tax is
also relevant. Tax structures that rely primarily on
ad valorem approaches, which tax based on a per
cent of product value, may have weaker health
impacts by facilitating substitution to cheaper
brands,14 15 compared to specific taxes, which are
levied on a specific quantity and therefore impact
all brands equally. Specific taxes that are not
indexed to inflation, however, devalue over
time.10–16
Even when well-structured high taxes are suc-
cessfully implemented, tobacco companies engage
in price discrimination to offset their effects. Price
discrimination is the process by which firms with
monopoly power segment their market and set
lower prices for those consumers who are most
price-sensitive.17 Tobacco companies accomplish
this by offering select retailers and consumers price
promotions, including volume-based discounts,
multipack offers and coupons,18–23 and by provid-
ing products in different price tiers, including
higher priced ‘premium’ products and lower priced
‘discount’ products.24 25 This produces a cigarette
market characterised by price dispersion, both
within and between price tiers.
As tobacco taxes rise, incentives for the industry
to engage in price discrimination to avoid losing
price sensitive customers increase. In the US alone,
dollars spent on cigarette advertising and promo-
tion rose from $8.37 billion in 2011 to $9.17
billion in 2012. Price discounts has been the largest
marketing expenditure category since 2002, and in
2012 it accounted for more than 85% of marketing
spending by the industry.26 In some places, price
gaps between premium and discount price tiers
have gotten larger as well, possibly due to dispro-
portionate shifting of tax increases to higher priced
brand variants to maintain options for price sensi-
tive customers.27 28 Elsewhere, however, this
pattern appears reversed, perhaps due to extensive
price promotions for premium brands.29 30
Tobacco users respond to opportunities to pur-
chase lower priced products.31 In various surveys,
between 25% and 40% of respondents report using
discounts and/or cheaper brands. Several US studies
found that purchasing cheaper brands, or buying
with a discount or multipack offer, was associated
with price reductions of up to $1 per pack.32–35
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People who engage in price-minimising strategies make fewer ces-
sation attempts and are less likely to reduce their smoking.36–38
Some of the highest risk groups for tobacco initiation and
use, including youth and people with lower incomes,39–42 are
also the most price sensitive, so price dispersion may be a par-
ticularly important policy target. Furthermore, groups engage in
different price minimisation strategies, so understanding
whether a policy is likely to change average prices, prices within
a specific price tier, or the availability of low price tiers, is
important for understanding potential impacts on vulnerable
populations. For example, more than one-third of youth
smokers report exposure to price coupons43 and young adults
are both more likely to use coupons or promotions, and less
likely to smoke discount brands, compared to older
smokers.44 45 Policies that shrink tier-specific price dispersion
may therefore have a particularly strong impact on youth.
Lower income smokers, however, are more likely to buy dis-
count brands,29 37 45 so policies that target low price tiers might
ameliorate socioeconomic disparities in smoking.
To boost prices in low tax areas and counteract tobacco indus-
try price reduction strategies, many governments are exploring
policies to increase tobacco prices through mechanisms other
than taxation, including setting minimum prices or banning pro-
motional discounts. Although the impact of tobacco tax policies
has been previously summarised,10 14 the practical and substan-
tive advantages and disadvantages of other price policy options
have not been similarly explored. To fill this gap, we conducted
a systematic review of the literature to determine how non-tax
tobacco price policies are described, recommended and
evaluated.
METHODS
Data sources
We searched six databases of peer-reviewed literature (PubMed,
CINAHL, EMBASE, Scopus, Academic Search Premier and
Legal Trac), and ROVER, a grey literature library maintained by
California’s Tobacco Control Library. We identified studies and
reports that contained one tobacco-related word (cigarette* or
tobacco*), one policy-related term (eg, ‘public policy’ or ‘law’)
and one price-related term (eg, ‘promotion,’ or ‘discount’).
After eliminating duplicates, this search produced 3067
abstracts.
Study selection
Two coders independently reviewed all English language
abstracts or full text publications that described, analysed or dis-
cussed a public policy likely to directly impact retail tobacco
prices through means other than taxation. We initially excluded
2824 abstracts that failed to reference any price-relevant
tobacco control policy, and an additional 187 articles that
focused on policies outside the scope of this review, described
potential price-related policies but made no explicit mention of
price impacts, were not an appropriate format (eg, news
reports), or were not in English. Following these exclusions, 56
articles (35 peer-reviewed studies and 21 reports) were included
in the review (figure 1).
Data extraction
One of two authors (SDG and MHS) read each article to
extract: publication year, policies described, geographic location
in which policies were considered, targeted tobacco product,
any empirical policy evaluation results, and other key findings
or conclusions. Each article was then read by the second
reviewer to collect information around three key themes: (1)
policy justification; (2) policy descriptions and recommenda-
tions; and (3) potential impacts of policies on price, consump-
tion or disparities.
Data synthesis
We calculated frequency measures for the policy types, locations
and targeted products, and then summarised the key theme data
using principles of qualitative analysis.46 Given the paucity of
empirical evaluations and heterogeneous policy types and out-
comes, we were prevented from conducting a meta-analysis.
Instead, we summarise the findings of each policy evaluation
individually.
RESULTS
With the exception of a 1986 article describing the potential for
advertising bans to impact product prices,47 all non-tax policy
articles in this review were published in 1999 or later, and 71%
(n=40) were published since 2010 (figure 2). Non-tax policies
were discussed with similar and increasing frequency in the US
and global contexts. Reviewed articles described a variety of
non-tax price policies, including price promotion restrictions
(n=41), minimum price policies (n=27), fee-based policies
(n=6) and price capping laws (n=4; see online supplementary
figure). These policies are defined in table 1. Price-relevant
aspects of other policies, such as sunshine laws, which require
reporting of industry price discounting and promotional pay-
ments,48 were mentioned but not substantially discussed in five
articles. The majority of articles described policies specifically
targeting cigarettes (n=48) or all tobacco products (n=33).
A small number of articles addressed policies related specifically
to cigars (n=2), smokeless (n=2), other tobacco products (n=4)
or electronic cigarettes (n=1).
Policy justification
Almost half of the articles (n=29, 48%) elaborated on reasons
that non-tax tobacco price policies are needed. In most of these
(n=22), evidence of industry efforts to keep prices low through
advertising and price promotions,11 36 47 49–53 price setting54 or
antiprice policy lobbying55 was used as a rationale, with some
emphasis on disproportionate targeting and tobacco use among
youth, African-Americans and residents of neighbourhoods with
Figure 1 Process of study selection.
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higher percentages of price-sensitive smokers.56–59 A few articles
analysed or cited evidence of public support for price-related pol-
icies,60 61 identified other policy benefits, like offsetting
tobacco-related public costs,62–64 or referenced similar policies
implemented for other products.54 65 Finally, several authors
identified gaps in existing legislation that needed to be filled.53 66
Policy descriptions, recommendations, political factors
and legal issues
Regardless of policy type, more than one-quarter of the articles
(n=15) recommended combining non-tax price policies with
taxes to prevent the use of price minimising strategies. Nearly
half of all articles (n=26) described political or legal issues
related to price-related policies, including: tobacco industry
opposition to, or efforts to circumvent, price-related policies;
the importance of considering rules related to commerce, free
speech and policy pre-emption by a higher level of government;
the value of consulting legal counsel in legislation design; and
concerns about the implications of price policies for low income
consumers. Recommendations, political factors and legal con-
cerns specific to each of the most cited non-tax policy types are
outlined in table 1, and summarised below.
Figure 2 Article describing non-tax price policies identified in systematic review by publication year and location (n=56).
Table 1 Non-tax price policies, recommendations and legal considerations described in the literature
Policy General description Recommendations Political arguments and legal considerations
Restrictions on
price
promotions
Bans or restrictions on tobacco product coupons,
value-added promotions (eg, ‘buy one get one’
offers), or retailer rebates (eg, buy-down
programmes)
▸ Create comprehensive, rather than
partial marketing bans and explicitly
include price promotion restrictions.
▸ Sufficiently enforce implemented price
promotion restrictions. Consider tying
adherence to licensing, where
appropriate.
▸ Ensure promotional bans apply only
within the jurisdiction in which the law
is passed
▸ Anticipate industry resistance to any promotional
restrictions
▸ In the USA, any impact on interstate commerce
must be offset by benefit to state or locality
▸ In the USA, states and localities can only restrict
the time, place and manner, but not the content,
of promotion
▸ In the USA, banning coupon redemption rather
than distribution may be less likely to inhibit
interstate commerce
Minimum price
laws
Laws that require a per cent mark-up on the
wholesale/retail price of a tobacco product and/or
a minimum floor price beneath which product
cannot be sold
▸ Consider a floor price structure
▸ Remove provisions that allow discounts,
coupons, buy-downs
▸ Set rates above those established by
free market
▸ Impose strong penalties and dedicate
more resources for enforcement.
▸ Extend to non-cigarette tobacco
products
▸ Might be politically feasible in places where
higher excise taxes are not.
▸ Draft laws to impact retailers in different
jurisdictions equally and to avoid price fixing.
▸ Could benefit the tobacco industry and do not
raise money for tobacco control efforts
Fee-based
policies
Laws applying a fee to tobacco products to offset
costs incurred by government related to
tobacco-related issues, including improperly
disposed cigarette butts/waste, and managing
retailer licensing programmes
▸ Base fee level on demonstrable costs
▸ Raised monies must be allocated to
programme costs (eg, litter clean-up
efforts, licensing programme
administration)
▸ To impact prices, fees may need to be
substantial
▸ In some places, local laws may be pre-empted by
laws from a higher level jurisdiction (eg, state or
federal)
▸ In addition to impacting price, mitigation fees
offset government costs for cleanup and result in
less toxic environments. One study found that
cigarette litter accounted for nearly ¼ of all
waste-related costs
Price capping Laws that place a cap on the pretax manufacturers’
price
▸ Base cap level on costs faced by firms
▸ Pair with high excise taxes to transfer
industry profits to government revenue
and promote tobacco control
▸ Pair with marketing restrictions to
inhibit targeted promotional discounts
in new markets
▸ Can be justified to counter excess market power
by few large tobacco companies
▸ Not well implemented for tobacco products, but
has been used in utilities
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Price promotion restrictions and bans
The review highlighted two different strategies for restricting
the ability of tobacco companies, wholesalers or retailers to use
price promotions to reduce tobacco prices: comprehensive
tobacco marketing legislation that includes price promotion
restrictions or standalone legislation restricting price promotions
only. Specific price promotion policy components
include banning or restricting: tobacco product coupons; value-
added promotions like multipack discounting or cross-product
promotions; and/or buy-down or master-type programmes in
which manufacturers offer price discounts to retailers or
wholesalers.
Nearly all of the articles discussing price promotions as part
of comprehensive marketing bans reference Article 13 of the
WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which
recommends marketing bans on both direct and indirect adver-
tising, including the distribution of promotional discounts.4 67
Several authors argued that few countries implement truly com-
prehensive marketing bans, often because the bans fail to
include point-of-sale or price promotion bans.68–70 Throughout
the marketing ban papers, authors noted the importance of
implementing comprehensive bans to ensure advertising oppor-
tunities were not simply moved to different channels following
partial bans.71–74 For example, Moodie et al75 documented an
increase in pack-based marketing, including price-related offers
on the pack, following the passage of the British Tobacco
Advertising and Promotion Act which eliminated many other
forms of marketing. In addition to moving into new marketing
venues, authors cautioned that the tobacco industry would
maximise marketing where restrictions are non-existent, work
to weaken any marketing regulation that is introduced and use
cross-border advertising to their advantage.72
Stand-alone price promotion policies were primarily discussed
in the USA, where the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act (TCA) bans redemption of coupons by
mail, but does not address the use of promotions in the retail
setting.36 The TCA permits state and local governments to regu-
late the sale and distribution of tobacco products, and also
amended earlier legislation to allow states and localities to regu-
late the time, place and manner,76 but not the content, of cigar-
ette advertisements or promotions. Although two reports
highlighted successful implementations of city policies,57 77
most of the US price promotion literature investigated potential
legal barriers and offered recommendations for legally defens-
ible legislation. State and local governments were cautioned to
limit burden on interstate commerce, and ensure their legisla-
tion does not go beyond legislation at higher levels of govern-
ment.57 78 To maximise legal viability, authors recommended
restricting advertising only within a specific jurisdiction,
banning the redemption of coupons rather than their distribu-
tion and targeting actual price reductions rather than specific
advertising messages.49 51 53 57 78 79 In places where tobacco
licenses are issued, adherence to price promotion rules could be
tied to licensing maintenance50 80 or restrictions on price pro-
motions could be added to existing minimum price
legislation.53 81 82
Minimum price policies
Minimum price laws (MPLs), originally implemented to protect
tobacco retailers from predatory business practices,11 82 establish
a minimum mark-up on the retail and/or wholesale price of a
tobacco product. Most literature on this topic came from the
US, where MPLs operate in about half of all states by levying a
per cent mark-up on a basic cost price.82 To eliminate discount
brands from the market, and for ease of administration, several
authors recommended a floor price structure, which sets a level
below which a product cannot be sold or a combination of a
floor price with either mark-ups50 58 or price capping policies.56
In addition, three strategies to enhance the impact of MPLs
were suggested: (1) eliminate the use of coupons, buy-downs or
other promotional strategies to lower prices below minimum
levels;11 36 51 52 58 63 82 83 (2) ensure that mark-ups are high
enough to result in prices above those determined naturally by
the market by setting high initial rates and indexing them to
inflation;52 58 83 84 and (3) impose strong penalties for violation
and provide resources for enforcement.83 85
MPLs were recognised as strategies that could complement
high excise taxes, or be more politically palatable in places
where raising excise taxes has been difficult.63 Authors cau-
tioned, however, that MPLs may be challenged as infringing too
much on free market competition52 86 or interstate commerce.52
To prevent such attacks, legislation should be drafted in a way
to stave off accusations of price fixing and to ensure that retai-
lers within and outside of the jurisdictional area are treated the
same way.51 52 63 Several authors also noted additional potential
consequences of MPLs, including increasing profits for the
tobacco industry and retailers in the place of increased revenue
from excise taxes,50 56 83 85 87 88 providing a basis for market-
ing products as sold at the ‘minimum legal price,’83 or encour-
aging cross-border purchasing if implemented irregularly.11
Fee-based policies
Although fees are similar to taxes because the amount added to
the price returns to government, we include them in our review
as distinct from taxes for two reasons. First, the funds raised by
fees cannot exceed the costs of implementing the services to
which they are attached; their allowable size must be determined
through careful analysis. Second, fees are a policy option avail-
able in some local communities that do not inherently have
taxing authority. Articles in this review described two types of
fees: mitigation and licensing fees. Cigarette butts are a
common type of litter89 that creates chemical hazards in public
spaces and incurs governmental costs for removal. Mitigation
fee policies levy per-pack fees to offset these costs and eliminate
some waste by-products. Two articles specifically described the
process and results of calculating the San Francisco litter abate-
ment policy; the author estimated that cleaning up cigarette
litter costs about 22 cents per pack,64 90 but also noted that
cities could use national or comparable place figures to calculate
appropriate fees. Licensing fees are charged to retailers to fund
the administration of retailer licensing programmes. Although
the initial search generated many articles describing licensing
fees, only two explicitly described the the potential impact on
product prices. Authors noted that substantial fee increases
(perhaps beyond what is justifiable in terms of costs) might be
needed to raise prices,63 and that indexing fees to inflation or
product prices could ensure they are sustained at relatively high
levels.62
Price caps
Four articles describe or propose price capping policies, which
set limits on the maximum price level that the industry can
charge for a product. By setting price caps close to the level of
production costs, authors argue that the large companies that
currently dominate the market will no longer be able to target
specific audiences with low prices, because they cannot make up
the profit loss through higher prices on other products or in
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other venues. Implemented by itself a price cap would then
compress prices, but might actually lower average product
prices. Supporters of price caps therefore recommend pairing
them with high excise taxes.54 56 91 In this way, product sales
generate ‘profits’ that are realised by the government, rather
than by the manufacturers or retailers.
Policy impacts
Although most of the articles discussed the potential of non-tax
price policies to reduce tobacco prices, consumption and/or
related health problems (n=46, 77%), only 16 articles (27%)
empirically examined policy impacts. Nine of these measured
the effect of a policy package without specifying outcomes for
price-related components. For example, seven articles used the
SimSmoke model to evaluate or predict the impact of different
recommended tobacco control strategies, including comprehen-
sive marketing bans, but did not isolate the effect of price pro-
motion restrictions within those bans. The remaining six
empirical impact articles explicitly assessed the impact of either
MPLs or price promotion restrictions a relevant
outcome.11 12 68 73 74 83 92 Of them, three cross-national com-
parisons documented positive associations between stronger
price promotion restrictions policies and decreased awareness of
promotional offers, two found no evidence that average cigar-
ette prices were higher in places that had implemented MPLs,
and one found no average price impacts of a voluntary,
industry-led policy. Findings of each article are further described
in table 2.
DISCUSSION
Policies targeting tobacco prices through mechanisms other than
taxes are gaining attention in the literature. The articles
reviewed here provide detailed definitions of price promotion
bans, minimum price legislation and other policies, as well as
suggestions for making them as strong and legally robust as pos-
sible. Policymakers or practitioners interested in exploring these
options, therefore, have resources that could guide policy devel-
opment. Given the economic and legal complexities outlined in
many of the reviewed works, as well as industry and political
challenges faced by most tobacco control legislation,49 51 52 58 78
this guidance may be necessary before adoption and sustained
implementation of any price-focused policies is commonplace.
Infrequent in the literature, however, are assessments of the
effectiveness of non-tax price policies as tobacco control strat-
egies. Associations between higher tobacco prices and lower
levels of tobacco consumption are already well established;1–3
what is not yet known is whether other policies can bring about
average price increases through means other than tax hikes. Our
search generated a small number of empirical assessments which
failed to isolate price effects; measured only proximal outcomes
like promotion awareness, or found no evidence that policies
successfully raised average cigarette prices.
Furthermore, we found little discussion and no evaluation of
the potential impact of the reviewed policies on price disper-
sion, either within or between price tiers. Yet several of these
policies may prove particularly useful in shrinking price disper-
sion, eliminating opportunities for the industry to leverage dif-
ferential profit margins to target marketing or offer discount
brands to price-sensitive smokers. More specifically, policies that
reduce price dispersion within price tiers may particularly
impact those smokers who are brand loyal, but frequently
exposed to coupons, like youth, whereas policies that reduce
price dispersion between price tiers could reduce consumption
among groups currently using deep discount brands, like low
income smokers. Understanding whether a policy impacts price
dispersion and how it does so, is therefore critical to predicting
the impact of that policy on vulnerable populations, another
topic that received little attention in the reviewed literature.
More rigorous evaluation is needed to identify the impact of
reviewed policies on average prices, as well as price dispersion
and tobacco use among price sensitive groups.
To support such endeavours, we hypothesise potential
mechanisms through which non-tax policies might influence
average prices and price dispersion, both within and between
price tiers and illustrate these in figure 3. In the first panel,
which represents an initial cigarette market, the black line tracks
Table 2 Articles that empirically assess non-tax price policies
Year
First
author Location Outcome measure Price-related article findings
Minimum price laws (MPLs)
2005 Feighery11 USA Cigarette prices Prices in states with MPLs were not significantly lower than prices in states without, but
were higher in NY, the one MPL state that prohibited special price promotions
2012 Tynan83 USA Cigarette prices Prices were lower in states with MPLs than in states without them. This finding was
consistent in the grocery channel (46 cents difference), drug channel (29 cents difference)
and convenience stores (13 cents difference)
Price promotion restrictions
2006 Harris73 UK, USA, Canada,
Australia
Awareness of promotions
(2002 and 2003)
Awareness of special price promotions declined from 62% to 46% in the UK in the year
following a ban on special price promotions. This change was greater than changes
occurring during the same time period in three countries that did not implement a ban
2008 Yong74 Malaysia,
Thailand
Awareness of promotions In two countries that have implemented similar marketing bans, 21.6% of respondents in
the country that does not enforce the ban (Malaysia) reported seeing special price offers,
compared to only 2.5% of smokers in the country that does enforce the ban (Thailand)
2009 Feighery12 USA Brand-specific price and
promotions in stores
There were no differences in prices or promotions for Phillip Morris USA cigarette brands in
stores where promotions were suspended by the company compared to stores that had not
been sanctioned
2011 Kasza68 UK, USA, Canada,
Australia
Awareness of promotions
(2002 and 2008)
Awareness of price promotions declined from 62% to 25% in the UK following the
implementation on a ban on special price promotions. This change was greater than
changes occurring during the same time period in three countries that did not implement a
ban
NY, New York.
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the initial average price of cigarettes across a range of price tiers
and grey shading surrounding the line illustrates depicts price
dispersion (figure 3A). Although the angle of the line, as well as
the size and placement of the shading, are hypothesised in the
figure, we used the empirical research described above about the
proportion of smokers who engage in price minimisation to
guide its development. In particular, since fewer than half of
smokers report using price promotions, we presume that there
are fewer purchases but a larger range of prices below the
average than above. The next six panels illustrate potential
impacts for each described policy. Price promotion bans reduce
price dispersion within price tiers by eliminating the lowest
prices, which has the effect of raising average prices (figure 3B).
MPLs, when implemented using an inviolable floor structure,
might eliminate deep discount brands from the
market altogether and slightly raise average prices for middle
price tiers whose initial dispersion included below-floor values
(figure 3C). In combination with price promotion bans, MPLs
also shrink price dispersion within all tiers (figure 3D). Fee pol-
icies shift the market upward by the amount of the fee, and
therefore only impact average prices (figure 3B). Finally, price
caps are designed to shrink industry profits, leaving fewer
resources to offset discounts on specific brands or make deep
discount brands feasible.54 Since they set a cap on what the
manufacturer can charge for the product, if implemented alone
they may actually lower average prices (figure 3F); to raise
average prices, they would need to be accompanied by a tax
increase to shifts the market upward (figure 3G).
Despite the potential promise illustrated in figure 3, price pro-
motion bans, MPLs, fee policies and price caps, when imple-
mented in isolation, are not without shortcomings. Although
isolated implementation may be necessary where tax hikes are
politically challenging, most of these policies will be most effect-
ive as complements, rather than substitutes, to excise taxes.
Furthermore, each policy design has limitations. MPLs may gen-
erate higher profits for retailers or tobacco companies that could
be used on other marketing efforts, perhaps undercutting their
effect. Promotional bans must be carefully constructed within
the context of free speech rules. Fee policies, because they are
tied to the real government costs, may only have a modest
impact on per unit prices and thus limited influence on smoking
behaviour. In addition, the extent to which a retailer licensing
fee is passed on to the consumer price of a tobacco product is
unclear, so price impacts could be even smaller. The ability of
price caps to influence price dispersion presumes diminished
profit shifting in the industry. Since most tobacco companies
operate in many markets worldwide, they may be able to offset
lost profits from price capping policies in single countries with
profits generated elsewhere. Finally, some policies that could
reduce disparities if they prompt lower income smokers to quit,
like floor price policies that eliminate discount brands, could
alternatively have a regressive impact if low income smokers
switch to higher priced products instead of reducing consump-
tion. Other policies like price promotion bans, however, may be
less regressive if the coupon use they eliminate is currently more
prevalent for premium brands.29
Figure 3 Mechanism through which non-tax policies might increase average tobacco product prices and reduce price dispersion.
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In addition, none of the described policies alleviate problems
with tax evasion and avoidance. Estimates from the
International Tobacco Control (ITC) Policy Evaluation project
indicate that in several countries, more than 10% of consumers
recently purchased from a low or untaxed source, whether
through legal or illicit means.93 These rates grow in places that
border low tax areas.94 Geographic variation in price policy
that produces different prices in neighbouring places, as well as
limited resources dedicated to policy enforcement, may facili-
tate tax avoidance. Unless the price policies described in this
review are implemented in a way to reduce this variation (eg,
at national levels or simultaneously in neighbouring jurisdic-
tions), they are unlikely to reduce this problem and like tax
increases, could increase it. Other tobacco control policies, like
enhanced tax stamps, track and trace technologies and licensing
laws are likely necessary for all price policies to fulfil their
potential.95
Our review also unveiled little discussion of promotional
bans, MPLs, price caps and fees in reference to non-cigarette
tobacco products. Smokeless tobacco products are popular
among youth, and prevalence of use exceeds that of cigarettes in
many countries, especially in South-East Asia.96 In the USA,
cigars, little cigars and smokeless products remain an important
source of tobacco for many people, with little decline in preva-
lence in recent years97–100 and use of electronic cigarettes is
rising, especially among youth.101 Pricing policies that apply pri-
marily to cigarettes may create a different type of price disper-
sion, based not on price tier but on product type, perhaps
encouraging price-sensitive consumers to switch or use both
cigarettes and other products, instead of quitting altogether.102
Although extending tax policies to non-cigarette products can
be challenging, due to variations in sizes, packaging and brands,
extensions of some non-tax price policies, like price promotion
regulations, might be straightforward. Additionally, in places like
the US, state and local governments may have more flexibility to
regulate pricing and promotions for other tobacco products
than they do for cigarettes, due to less pre-emption by federal
laws.66
Our search has several limitations. Since our search was com-
pleted, several major changes have occurred in the tobacco
control landscape, including the issuing of the Surgeon
General’s report of 2014 and the Food and Drug
Administration’s proposal to extend regulation to more tobacco
products in the USA In each of these, federal agencies highlight
non-cigarette products, which might have spurred further dis-
cussion of them elsewhere in the literature. Although our search
terms and strategy resulted in a seemingly comprehensive set of
relevant policies, some key literature could have been omitted.
We searched for tobacco and cigarette-specific terms rather than
product names, anticipating that articles that referred to a par-
ticular product, like snus, would also reference tobacco or cigar-
ettes. Our search was also limited to English language articles,
and the library used to search grey literature was based in the
USA. We may therefore have missed some relevant literature,
such as legal commentary, from abroad. Finally, the small
number of empirical studies prevented us from conducting
meta-analyses or comparing the quality of their approaches. We
caution readers to review the methodology of each before
extrapolating results more generally.
CONCLUSIONS
Although increasing tobacco excise taxes is a central tenet of
comprehensive tobacco control,103 these policies alone may be
insufficient for maintaining high prices, or reducing price
discrimination, due to industry tactics to keep at least some
prices low.50 104 105 Policies that set pricing floors, limit the
ability of the industry to use price variation in marketing and
recoup public costs of tobacco use are gaining attention in prac-
tice and in the scientific literature. More empirical evaluations
are needed to ascertain the extent to which these policies can
complement or substitute for excise taxes by generating higher
prices, shrinking price dispersion, reducing consumption and
ameliorating tobacco-related disparities. A number of articles
and reports focused on design and implementation of most
non-tax price policies, however, are currently available, and may
be valuable to policymakers and tobacco control professionals
interested in investigating these options further.
What this paper adds
▸ Minimum price laws and restrictions on price promotions are
gaining research attention as promising complements to
excise taxes.
▸ Given the paucity of empirical studies, there is limited
evidence to date that non-tax policies can successfully raise
tobacco prices.
▸ Most non-tax approaches focus on cigarettes; thus
policymakers have an opportunity to apply these policy
approaches to non-cigarette tobacco products.
▸ Policymakers should consult legal assistance to navigate the
specific constraints of their regulatory environment when
drafting non-tax policies.
Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Lisa Peterson, M.L.S,
California ‘Rover’ Tobacco Control Library, University of California, Davis for her
invaluable assistance in searching the grey literature.
Contributors SDG conducted the search and managed the review process. SDG,
MHS and KMR developed an article coding strategy, with input from ECF, AR and
TR. SDG and MHS abstracted all data and drafted the manuscript. ECF, AR, TR and
KMR provided input into the interpretation and discussion of the results, and edited
manuscript drafts. All authors reviewed and approved the final version of the
manuscript.
Funding Research reported in this paper was supported by grant number
CA154281 from the National Cancer Institute at the National Institutes of Health as
part of the ASPiRE study (Advancing Science and Policy in the Retail Environment),
and M H Smith’s fellowship was supported by grant number 1P50CA180907-01
from the National Cancer Institute and FDA Center for Tobacco Products (CTP). The
content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent
the official views of the NIH or the Food and Drug Administration.
Competing interests KMR is a Special Government Employee and member of the
Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee for the FDA Center for Tobacco
Products—the views expressed in this paper are his and not those of the FDA. KMR
has served as an expert consultant in litigation against cigarette manufacturers and
Internet tobacco vendors.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
Open Access This is an Open Access article distributed in accordance with the
Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY-NC 4.0) license, which
permits others to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon this work non-commercially,
and license their derivative works on different terms, provided the original work is
properly cited and the use is non-commercial. See: http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc/4.0/
REFERENCES
1 US Department of Health and Human Services. The Health Consequences of
Smoking: 50 Years of Progress. A Report of the Surgeon General. Atlanta, GA:
US Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion,
Office on Smoking and Health, 2014.
2 Ross H, Blecher E, Yan L, et al. Do cigarette prices motivate smokers to quit? New
evidence from the ITC survey. Addiction 2011;106:609–19.
Golden SD, et al. Tob Control 2016;25:377–385. doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2015-052294 383
Review
3 Chaloupka FJ, Straif K, Leon ME. Effectiveness of tax and price policies in tobacco
control. Tob Control 2011;20:235–8.
4 World Health Organization. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.
Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2003.
5 World Health Organization. WHO technical manual on tobacco tax administration.
World Health Organization, 2010.
6 Hill S, Amos A, Clifford D, et al. Impact of tobacco control interventions on
socioeconomic inequalities in smoking: review of the evidence. Tob Control
2014;23(e2):e89–97.
7 Brown T, Platt S, Amos A. Equity impact of interventions and policies to reduce
smoking in youth: systematic review. Tob Control 2014;23(e2):e98–105.
8 Keeler TE, Hu T-w, Barnett PG, et al. Do cigarette producers price-discriminate by
state? An empirical analysis of local cigarette pricing and taxation. J Health Econ
1996;15:499–512.
9 The International Tobacco Control Policy Evaluation Project. Tobacco price and
taxation: ITC cross-country comparison report. 2014.
10 Smith KE, Savell E, Gilmore AB. What is known about tobacco industry efforts to
influence tobacco tax? A systematic review of empirical studies. Tob Control
2013;22:144–53.
11 Feighery EC, Ribisl KM, Schleicher NC, et al. How do minimum cigarette
price laws affect cigarette prices at the retail level? Tob Control 2005;14:
80–5.
12 Feighery EC, Schleicher NC, Ribisl KM, et al. An examination of the effect on
cigarette prices and promotions of Philip Morris USA penalties to stores that sell
cigarettes to minors. Tob Control 2009;18:502–4.
13 Orzechowski W, Walker R. The tax burden on tobacco. Historical Compilation
2014. Arlington, VA: Orzechowski and Walker, 2012.
14 Chaloupka FJ, Yurekli A, Fong GT. Tobacco taxes as a tobacco control strategy.
Tob Control 2012;21:172–80.
15 Chaloupka FJ, Kostova D, Shang C. Cigarette excise tax structure and cigarette
prices: evidence from the global adult tobacco survey and the US National Adult
Tobacco Survey. Nicotine Tob Res 2014;16(Suppl 1):S3–9.
16 Institute of Medicine. Ending the tobacco problem: a blueprint for the nation.
Washington DC: The National Academies Press, 2007.
17 Stole L. Price discrimination and competition, chapter 34. In: Armstrong M, Porter
R, eds. Handbook of industrial organization. Amsterdam: Elsevier North-Holland,
2007:2221–99.
18 Chaloupka FJ, Cummings KM, Morley C, et al. Tax, price and cigarette smoking:
evidence from the tobacco documents and implications for tobacco company
marketing strategies. Tob Control 2002;11(Suppl 1):i62–72.
19 Feighery EC, Ribisl KM, Schleicher NC, et al. Retailer participation in cigarette
company incentive programs is related to increased levels of cigarette advertising
and cheaper cigarette prices in stores. Prev Med 2004;38:876–84.
20 Feighery EC, Ribisl KM, Clark PI, et al. How tobacco companies ensure prime
placement of their advertising and products in stores: interviews with retailers
about tobacco company incentive programmes. Tob Control 2003;12:184–8.
21 Loomis BR, Farrelly MC, Mann NH. The association of retail promotions for
cigarettes with the Master Settlement Agreement, tobacco control programmes
and cigarette excise taxes. Tob Control 2006;15:458–63.
22 Brock B, Schillo BA, Moilanen M. Tobacco industry marketing: an analysis of direct
mail coupons and giveaways. Tob Control 2015;24:505–8.
23 Pierce JP, Gilmer TP, Lee L, et al. Tobacco industry price-subsidizing promotions
may overcome the downward pressure of higher prices on initiation of regular
smoking. Health Econ 2005;14:1061–71.
24 Greenland SJ. Cigarette brand variant portfolio strategy and the use of colour in a
darkening market. Tob Control 2015;24(e1):e65–71.
25 Tauras J, Peck R, Chaloupka F. The role of retail prices and promotions in
determining cigarette brand market shares. Rev Ind Organ 2006;28:253–84.
26 Federal Trade Commission. Federal Trade Commission cigarette report for 2011.
Washington DC, 2013.
27 Gilmore AB, Tavakoly B, Taylor G, et al. Understanding tobacco industry pricing
strategy and whether it undermines tobacco tax policy: the example of the UK
cigarette market. Addiction 2013;108:1317–26.
28 Saenz de Miera Juarez B, Thrasher JF, Reynales Shigematsu LM, et al. Tax, price
and cigarette brand preferences: a longitudinal study of adult smokers from the
ITC Mexico Survey. Tob Control 2014;23(Suppl 1):i80–5.
29 Cornelius ME, Driezen P, Fong GT, et al. Trends in the use of premium and
discount cigarette brands: findings from the ITC US Surveys (2002–2011). Tob
Control 2014;23(Suppl 1):i48–53.
30 Nargis N, Fong GT, Chaloupka FJ, et al. The choice of discount brand cigarettes: a
comparative analysis of International Tobacco Control surveys in Canada and the
USA (2002–2005). Tob Control 2014;23(Suppl 1):i86–96.
31 Dhar SK, Hoch SJ. Price discrimination using in-store merchandising. J Mark
1996;60:17–30.
32 Caraballo RS, Wang X, Xu X. Can you refuse these discounts? An evaluation of
the use and price discount impact of price-related promotions among US adult
smokers by cigarette manufacturers. BMJ Open 2014;4:e004685.
33 Pesko MF, Xu X, Tynan MA, et al. Per-pack price reductions available from
different cigarette purchasing strategies: United States, 2009–2010. Prev Med
2014;63:13–19.
34 Cornelius ME, Driezen P, Hyland A, et al. Trends in cigarette pricing and
purchasing patterns in a sample of US smokers: findings from the ITC US surveys
(2002–2011). Tob Control 2015;24(Suppl 3):iii4–10.
35 Xu X, Malarcher A, O’Halloran A, et al. Does every US smoker bear the same
cigarette tax? Addiction 2014;109:1741–9.
36 Choi K, Hennrikus DJ, Forster JL, et al. Receipt and redemption of cigarette
coupons, perceptions of cigarette companies and smoking cessation. Tob Control
2013;22:418–22.
37 Licht AS, Hyland AJ, O’connor RJ, et al. Socio-economic variation in price
minimizing behaviors: findings from the International Tobacco Control (ITC) Four
Country Survey. Int J Environ Res Public Health 2011;8:234–52.
38 Hyland A, Laux FL, Higbee C, et al. Cigarette purchase patterns in four
countries and the relationship with cessation: findings from the International
Tobacco Control (ITC) Four Country Survey. Tob Control 2006;15(Suppl 3):
iii59–64.
39 Ross H, Chaloupka FJ. The effect of cigarette prices on youth smoking. Health
Econ 2003;12:217–30.
40 Chaloupka FJ, Wechsler H. Price, tobacco control policies and smoking among
young adults. J Health Econ 1997;16:359–73.
41 Farrelly MC, Bray JW, Pechacek T, et al. Response by adults to increases in
cigarette prices by sociodemographic characteristics. South Econ J 2001:156–65.
42 Azagba S, Sharaf M. Cigarette taxes and smoking participation: evidence
from recent tax increases in Canada. Int J Environ Res Public Health 2011;
8:1583–600.
43 Tessman GK, Caraballo RS, Corey CG, et al. Exposure to tobacco coupons among
US middle and high school students. Am J Prev Med 2014;47(2, Supplement 1):
S61–8.
44 Leatherdale ST, Ahmed R, Barisic A, et al. Cigarette brand preference as a function
of price among smoking youths in Canada: are they smoking premium, discount
or native brands? Tob Control 2009;18:466–73.
45 Choi K, Hennrikus D, Forster J, et al. Use of price-minimizing strategies by smokers
and their effects on subsequent smoking behaviors. Nicotine Tob Res
2012;14:864–70.
46 Patton MQ. Qualitative research and evaluation methods. Thousand Oaks, Calif:
Sage Publications, 2002.
47 Warner K, Ernster V, Holbrook J, et al. Public policy on smoking and health:
toward a smoke-free generation by the year 2000. A statement of a working
group to the Subcommittee on Smoking of the American Heart Association.
Circulation 1986;73:381A–95A.
48 Tobacco Control Legal Consortium. Sunshine laws: requiring reporting of tobacco
industry price discounting and promotional allowance payments to retailers and
wholesalers. 2012.
49 Tobacco Control Legal Consortium. Policy approaches to restricting tobacco
product coupons and retail value-added promotions. 2013. http://www.
publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/
tclc-guide-policy-approaches-pricing-cppw-2013.pdf (accessed July 2015)
50 Public Health Policy Change Webinar Series. Policy options for combating tobacco
industry price discounting. Public Health Law Center, 2012.
51 Miura M. Regulating tobacco product pricing: guidelines for state and local
governments. Tobacco Control Legal Consortium, 2010.
52 Tobacco Control Legal Consortium. Cigarette Minimum Price Laws. 2011. http://
www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/
tclc-guide-cigminimumpricelaws-2011.pdf (accessed July 2015)
53 Berman M, Snyder KM. Tobacco price promotion: policy responses to industry
price manipulation. Center for Public Health and Tobacco Policy, 2011.
54 Gilmore AB, Branston JR, Sweanor D. The case for OFSMOKE: how tobacco price
regulation is needed to promote the health of markets, government revenue and
the public. Tob Control 2010;19:423–30.
55 Smith EA, Blackman VS, Malone RE. Death at a discount: how the tobacco
industry thwarted tobacco control policies in US military commissaries. Tob Control
2007;16:38–46.
56 Burton S, Williams K, Fry R, et al. Marketing cigarettes when all else is
unavailable: evidence of discounting in price-sensitive neighbourhoods. Tob
Control 2014;23(e1):e24–9.
57 Sorg A, Walsh H, Jones J, et al. Regulating Price Discounting in Providence, RI
Innovative Point-of-Sale Policies: Case Study #1. St Louis, MO: Center for Public
Health Systems Science, George Warren Brown School of Social Work at
Washington University, 2013.
58 Center for Public Health Systems Science, George Warren Brown School of Social
Work, Tobacco Control Legal Consortium. Pricing policy: a Tobacco control guide.
St. Louis, MO: Center for Public Health Systems Science, 2014.
59 Willemsen MC, De Zwart WM. The effectiveness of policy and health education
strategies for reducing adolescent smoking: a review of the evidence. J Adolesc
1999;22:587–99.
384 Golden SD, et al. Tob Control 2016;25:377–385. doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2015-052294
Review
60 Gallus S, Tramacere I, Zuccaro P, et al. Attitudes and perceptions towards increasing
cigarette price: a population-based survey in Italy. Prev Med 2008;47:454–5.
61 Crawford MA, Balch GI, Mermelstein R, et al. Responses to tobacco control
policies among youth. Tob Control 2002;11:14–19.
62 Tobacco Technical Assistance Consortium.Addressing Tobacco Pricing Policies: A
Toolkit for Tobacco Control Program Managers. 2011. http://www.ttac.org/services/
pricing_strategies/ (accessed July 2015)
63 Ribisl KM, Rogers T, Mahoney M. Assessing Alternative Tobacco Price Policy
Options: CPPW Annual Training - March 29, 2011. 2011. http://countertobacco.
org/sites/default/files/Asessing%20Alternative%20Tobacco%20Price%20Policy%
20Options%20-%20CPPW%20Annual%20Training%202011%20-%20Ribisl%2C
%20Rogers%20Mahoney.pdf (accessed July 2015)
64 Schneider JE, Decker CS, Doyle A, Meinders K, Kiss N. Estimates of the costs of
tobacco litter in San Francisco and Calculations of maximum permissible per-pack
fees. Health Economics Consulting Group LLC. 2009. http://www.
greencitiescalifornia.org/assets/waste/SF_cigarette-litter_Tobacco-Litter-Study.doc
(accessed July 2015)
65 Chapman S, Freeman B. Regulating the tobacco retail environment: beyond
reducing sales to minors. Tob Control 2009;18:496–501.
66 Freiberg M. Options for state and local governments to regulate non-cigarette
tobacco products. Ann Health Law 2012;21:407–45, 5 p preceding i.
67 World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Conference
of the Parties. Guidelines for implementation of Article 13 of the WHO
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (Tobacco advertising, promotion and
sponsorship). Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Conference of the
Parties. 2008. http://www.who.int/fctc/guidelines/article_13.pdf?ua=1 (accessed
July 2015)
68 Kasza KA, Hyland AJ, Brown A, et al. The effectiveness of tobacco marketing
regulations on reducing smokers’ exposure to advertising and promotion: findings
from the International Tobacco Control (ITC) Four Country Survey. Int J Environ Res
Public Health 2011;8:321–40.
69 Giskes K, Kunst AE, Ariza C, et al. Applying an equity lens to tobacco-control
policies and their uptake in six Western-European countries. J Public Health Policy
2007;28:261–80.
70 Henriksen L. Comprehensive tobacco marketing restrictions: promotion, packaging,
price and place. Tob Control 2012;21:147–53.
71 Loubeau PR. The challenges of tobacco control in Romania. Policy review. Cent
Eur J Public Health 2013;21:98–103.
72 Nagler RH, Viswanath K. Implementation and research priorities for FCTC Articles
13 and 16: tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship and sales to and by
minors. Nicotine Tob Res 2013;15:832–46.
73 Harris F, MacKintosh AM, Anderson S, et al. Effects of the 2003 advertising/
promotion ban in the United Kingdom on awareness of tobacco marketing:
findings from the International Tobacco Control (ITC) Four Country Survey. Tob
Control 2006;15(Suppl 3):iii26–33.
74 Yong H-H, Borland R, Hammond D, et al. Levels and correlates of awareness of
tobacco promotional activities among adult smokers in Malaysia and Thailand:
findings from the International Tobacco Control Southeast Asia (ITC-SEA) Survey.
Tob Control 2008;17:46–52.
75 Moodie C, Hastings GB. Making the pack the hero, tobacco industry response to
marketing restrictions in the UK: findings from a long-term audit. Int J Ment
Health Addict 2011;9:24–38.
76 Pearson A, Hoefges M, Lange T, et al. Regulating Tobacco product advertising and
promotions in the retail environment: a roadmap for states and localities, J Law
Med Ethics 2015. In Press.
77 The Center for Tobacco Policy and Organizing A. Local Tobacco policies in the
retail environment. American Lung Association in California: California Department
of Public Health, 2013.
78 Dachille K. Regulating Tobacco advertising and promotion: “a commerce clause”
overview for state and local governments. Tobacco Control Legal Consortium, 2010.
79 Tobacco Control Legal Consortium. Tobacco Coupon Regulations and Sampling
Restrictions. 2011. http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/
tclc-guide-tobcouponregsandsampling-2011.pdf ( July 2015)
80 Public Health Law Center at William Mitchell College of Law. Prohibiting Tobacco
Product Coupon Redemption: Sample Language to Amend Existing Minnesota
Tobacco Licensing Ordinances. 2011. http://countertobacco.org/sites/default/files/lz/
Restricting%20Coupon%20Redemption%20in%20Minnesota%20Final.pdf
(accessed July 2015)
81 Rabin RL. Controlling the retail sales environment: access, advertising, and
promotional activities. In: Bonnie RJ, Stratton K, Wallace RB, eds. Ending the
tobacco problem: a blueprint for the nation. Washington DC: National Academies
Press, 2007:641–52.
82 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. State cigarette minimum price
laws-United States, 2009. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2010;59:389–92.
83 Tynan MA, Ribisl KM, Loomis BR. Impact of cigarette minimum price laws on the
retail price of cigarettes in the USA. Tob Control 2013;22(e1):e78–85.
84 Center for Public Health and Tobacco Policy. Just the Facts: New York Cigarette
Marketing Standards Act. 2012. http://www.tobaccopolicycenter.org/documents/
CMSA%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (accessed July 2015)
85 Joint Legislative Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review
(PEER). A Review of the Department of Revenue’s Enforcement of Mississippi’s
“Unfair Cigarette Sales Law”. 2010. http://www.peer.state.ms.us/reports/rpt541.
pdf (accessed July 2105)
86 Chaloupka FJ. Commentary on Ross, et al. (2011): beyond cigarette taxes–the
need for research on other cigarette pricing policies. Addiction 2011;106:620–1.
87 Feighery E, Rogers T, Ribisl K. Tobacco retail price manipulation policy strategy
summit proceedings. Sacramento, CA: California Department of Public Health,
California Tobacco Control Program, 2009.
88 Michael J. The Unfair Cigarette Sales Act. St Paul, Minnesota: Minnesota House of
Representatives, Research Department, September 2000. http://www.leg.state.mn.
us/docs/pre2003/other/000646.pdf (accessed July 2015)
89 Tobacco Control Legal Consortium. Policy tools for minimizing public health and
environmental effects of cigarette waste: tips and tools. 2014. http://
publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/
tclc-guide-cigarette-waste-2014.pdf (accessed July 2015)
90 Schneider JE, Peterson NA, Kiss N, et al. Tobacco litter costs and public policy: a
framework and methodology for considering the use of fees to offset abatement
costs. Tob Control 2011;20(Suppl 1):i36–41.
91 Branston JR, Gilmore AB. The case for Ofsmoke: the potential for price cap regulation
of tobacco to raise pound500 million per year in the UK. Tob Control 2014;23:45–50.
92 de Ojeda A, Barnoya J, Thrasher JF. Availability and costs of single cigarettes in
Guatemala. Nicotine Tob Res 2013;15:83–7.
93 Guindon GE, Driezen P, Chaloupka FJ, et al. Cigarette tax avoidance and evasion:
findings from the International Tobacco Control Policy Evaluation (ITC) Project. Tob
Control 2014;23(suppl 1):i13–22.
94 Nagelhout GE, van den Putte B, Allwright S, Socioeconomic and country variations
in cross-border cigarette purchasing as tobacco tax avoidance strategy. Findings
from the ITC Europe Surveys. Tob Control 2014;23(Suppl 1):i30–8.
95 National Research Council. Understanding the US illicit tobacco market:
characteristics, policy context, and lessons from international experiences.
Washington DC: The National Academies Press, 2015.
96 National Cancer Institute and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Smokeless Tobacco and Public Health: A Global Perspective. Bethesda, MD: US
Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention and National Institutes of Health, National Cancer Institute. NIH
Publication No. 14-7983; 2014.
97 Arrazola RA, Neff LJ, Kennedy SM, et al. Tobacco use among middle and high school
students—United States, 2013. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2014;63:1021–6.
98 Agaku IT, King BA, Husten CG, et al. Tobacco product use among adults—United
States, 2012–2013. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2014;63:542–7.
99 King BA, Tynan MA, Dube SR, et al. Flavored-little-cigar and flavored-cigarette use
among U.S. middle and high school students. J Adolesc Health 2014;54:40–6.
100 Delnevo CD, Giovenco DP, Ambrose BK, et al. Preference for flavoured cigar
brands among youth, young adults and adults in the USA. Tob Control
2015;24:389–94.
101 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. Notes from the field: electronic cigarette
use among middle and high school students-United States, 2011–2012. MMWR
Centers for Disease Control Prevention, 2013:729.
102 Da Pra M, Arnade C. Tobacco product demand, cigarette taxes, and market
substitution. 2009 Agricultural and Applied Economics Association Annual
Meeting; 26–28 July 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 2009.
103 WHO Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic, 2008: The MPOWER package.
Switzerland, Geneva: World Health Organization, 2008. http://www.who.int/tobacco/
mpower/mpower_report_full_2008.pdf (accessed July 2015)
104 McLaughlin I, Pearson A, Laird-Metke E, et al. Reducing tobacco use and access
through strengthened minimum price laws. Am J Public Health
2014;104:1844–50.
105 World Health Organization. WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic, 2013:
enforcing bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship. World Health
Organization, 2013.
Golden SD, et al. Tob Control 2016;25:377–385. doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2015-052294 385
Review
